Phenomenological hermeneutics…

What is it and why do I care?

I’m doing more reading these days regarding how I’m doing research than actually doing my research. Thus there is a lot of reflection going on about my process and the contexts or frameworks within which I’m operating, along with a consideration of the impacts of these so-called contexts. [Apparently I have a lot in common with students who also seek “contexts” as part of their research process (Head and Eisenberg, 2009).] I prefer to use the term “context” because I find the term framework to imply something that is fixed, while context has a looser feel. Context, because it seems looser, also nicely encompasses the iterative nature I’ve automatically used in my research process.

So why am I now talking of hermeneutic phenomenology/phenomenological hermeneutics? It just struck a note of déjà vu when I tripped on mention of it in Bonna Jones’ article “Reductionism and library and information science philosophy” in Journal of Documentation, v. 64(4), 2008: 482-495. My process seems to reflect aspects of this philosophical construct. According to PhilWeb, “[h]ermeneutical phenomenology studies interpretive structures of experience, how we understand and engage things around us in our human world, including ourselves and others” (Accessed May 13, 2009: http://www.phillwebb.net/topics/communication/Interpretation/InterpretationTheory.htm).

Of further interest, the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed. Vol. 4 (Dennis J. Schmidt (2005) Hermeneutics, New York: Macmillan Reference USA: 334-336) notes that hermeneutics originally was concerned with the interpretation of texts, literally. In the 20th century, Heidegger extends hermeneutics much further applying it to cognition and to experience. He understands “truth to be a matter of interpretation rather than objectivity” and that “lived experience is taken to be the working out of the factical conditions upon which any understanding whatsoever can be founded (335).” Add this to Gadamer’s work that wants to expose all forms of understanding: “Gadamer understands hermeneutics not as a method, but more as a sort of dialogue or conversation” and in this dialogue one must be “aware of the formative roles of history and language” because this is what challenges one to “reflect upon and reach beyond the limits that are inscribed in its own roots in tradition and language” (336). His iterative approach (assuming dialogue is iterative) certainly describes my research process, and as this blog shows, also reflectivity and an exploration of a multitude of relevant “contexts”.
Phenomenology: “a purely descriptive study of any given subject matter (278)” that “in the narrower sense (279)” “has become the name of a way of doing philosophy (279)” or a philosophical movement. Phenomenology is a non-empirical science (279). (The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed. Vol. 7 (Richard Schmitt (1967) updated by Benjamin Fiedor (2005) 278-301, and Jitendra n. Mohanty (1996) Phenomenology [Addendum]. New York: Macmillan Reference USA)).

Why do I care? As a philosophical construct hermeneutical phenomenology “studies interpretive structures of experience” which reflects what I believe I am doing. I am studying how others create the construct of competency (intellectually and structurally within the text) based not just on their experience of it (one would assume) but also the authors’ history with competency (see authors’ references to established association definitions, frameworks etc of competency in the articles, e.g. SLA). Thus how they construct their discussion of competency and their use of language reflects their understanding of competency…though I’m tempted to say the maturity of their understanding in this case because of the disjunct between their discussions of competency and their “definition”.

My understanding of competency as applied to their work as a group (meta-analysis) further interprets the various authors’ interpretations and helps inform the LIS field. Agreement or disagreement furthers our understanding of the topic at hand…and it doesn’t matter who is “right” or not, that is irrelevant in this context. It is whether the review was rigorous or not.